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INTRODUCTION
American consumer transactions increasingly occur via credit or
debit card rather than in cash. Every day, credit card transactions
generate countless receipts. Some consumers take care to shred or
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dispose of their receipts to avoid credit card fraud and identity theft.1
Some may even notice that those receipts include only a few digits of
the credit card number and no expiration date. Why then have we
been told to shred our credit card receipts, when they appear to lack
significant credit card information?2 Today, the truncation of credit
card numbers and the removal of expiration dates from credit card
receipts are near ubiquitous.3 This ubiquity is a product of federal law
and extensive class action litigation—litigation that continues today.4
In recent years, well-known companies such as Southwest Airlines,5
FedEx,6 J. Crew,7 Sunoco,8 and RadioShack9 have all defended
against class action litigation for failure to truncate credit card
numbers or remove expiration dates.

1. That consumers ought to shred credit card receipts remains common advice. See,
e.g., Veronica Dudley, Tips for Safe, Secure Holiday Shopping, FORT LEAVENWORTH LAMP
(Nov. 26, 2014, 10:31 AM), http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/article/20141126/NEWS
/141129486/0/SEARCH?template=printart [perma.cc/WC55-8NND]; Mort Mazor, Residents
Learn How to Deal with Identity Theft, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.) (May 2, 2014),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-05-02/news/fl-cn-identity-0504-20140502_1_identitytheft-credit-report-pre-approved-credit-applications [https://perma.cc/T6FG-JJ2Z].
2. Unsigned credit card receipts with only the last four numbers of the card need not
be shredded, though signed receipts still ought to be shredded as the signature could be
used by fraudsters. See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, Financial Tuneup: What You Need to
Shred, N.Y. TIMES: BUCKS BLOG (Mar. 30, 2010, 10:48 AM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes
.com/2010/03/30/financial-tuneup-what-you-need-to-shred/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5UBCAHRL].
3. See, e.g., Melody Warnick, 9 Things You Should Know About Your Credit Card
Receipt, CREDITCARDS.COM (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news
/9-things-to-know-about-credit_card-receipts-1273.php [https://perma.cc/294Q-6VHD].
4. See infra Sections I.A–I.C.
5. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Southwest Exposed Credit Card Info on Receipts, Suit Says,
LAW360 (Nov. 28, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/397228/southwestexposed-credit-card-info-on-receipts-suit-says?article_related_content=1 [https://perma.cc
/5DCR-5KLG] (failure to remove expiration dates).
6. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, FedEx Settles Customers’ FACTA Suit with $50 Gift
Cards, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/388800/fedexsettles-customers-facta-suit-with-50-gift-cards?article_related_content=1 [https://perma.cc
/5BL9-FGR4] (printed six digits of credit card numbers).
7. Lisa Ryan, J. Crew Sued for Showing Credit Card Digits on Receipts, LAW360
(Jan. 13, 2015, 5:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/610999/j-crew-sued-for-showingcredit-card-digits-on-receipts [https://perma.cc/NAM3-4WAB] (printed nine of sixteen
digits of the credit card number).
8. Christine Caulfield, Sunoco Exposes Consumers to Identity Theft: Suit, LAW360
(Apr. 13, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/22613/sunoco-exposes-consumers
-to-identity-theft-suit?article_related_content=1 [https://perma.cc/7KGF-VEV2] (failure to
remove expiration dates).
9. Jonathan Randles, 7th Circuit Cancels $10 RadioShack Coupon Settlement, LAW360
(Sept. 19, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/579365/7th-circ-cancels-10radioshack-coupon-settlement [https://perma.cc/43TG-9D7M] (failed to remove expiration
dates).
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Congress passed the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
of 200310 (“FACTA”) to systematically address issues of identity
theft.11 By requiring the truncation of credit card numbers and the
removal of expiration dates from most credit card receipts,12 FACTA
aimed to deprive identity thieves and fraudsters of a common source
of credit card information.13 Since FACTA went into effect, the lure
of attorneys’ fees and aggregated statutory damages (in class action
suits) has generated much litigation and hundreds of written
decisions, typically at the district court level.14 Prior to the Supreme
Court’s seminal decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,15 defendants rarely
succeeded in obtaining dismissal of such cases on 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.16 Since Iqbal, however, district courts have shown an
increasing willingness to question the adequacy of complaints,
particularly with regard to the willful violation of FACTA that
plaintiffs must allege to recover statutory damages under the law.17 If
a court does not find a plaintiff’s allegations of willfulness plausible,
the plaintiff can only recover actual damages.18 Because consumers
rarely, if ever, suffer significant actual damages from the printing of
noncompliant receipts, inadequately pleading a willful violation will
almost always result in dismissal of the claim.19
10. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat.
1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)).
11. See infra Section I.A.
12. For purposes of this Comment, “truncation requirement” refers only to the
requirement that no more than the last five numbers of a credit card number be printed.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2012).
13. Id.; see also Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241 § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. 1565 (2008) (“The Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act . . . was enacted into law in 2003 and [one] of the purposes of such Act is
to prevent criminals from obtaining access to consumers’ private financial and credit
information in order to reduce identity theft and credit card fraud.”).
14. As of January 24, 2016, a Westlaw search for the relevant section of the United
States Code “15 USC 1681c(g)” returns 235 written decisions. As Congress has
recognized, hundreds more lawsuits have been filed. See infra Section I.B. “Aggregated
statutory damages” means the available statutory damages multiplied by the number of
members of a class. FACTA provides for statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000
per violation, § 1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to the possibility of punitive damages,
§ 1681n(a)(2). In class action FACTA receipt requirement litigation, classes can easily
exceed 10,000; 100,000; or even 1 million members, resulting in potentially massive
damages awards, sometimes even exceeding $1 billion. See infra notes 55–59 and
accompanying text.
15. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
16. See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2012) (“Civil liability for negligent noncompliance”).
19. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Despite FACTA’s success in incentivizing retailers to remove
credit card information from customer receipts, a serious question
remains as to whether the costs of FACTA receipt litigation and the
concomitant liability or settlements—costs which are passed on to
consumers—outweigh the benefits to consumers in preventing
identity theft.20 This question becomes particularly acute if one
considers the requirement to remove expiration dates in isolation
from the truncation requirement. While the benefits of the latter are
clear, the expiration date requirement provides no additional
consumer benefit while creating significant compliance costs for
retailers—costs ultimately borne by consumers.21 Given that the
expiration date requirement fails any cost-benefit analysis,22 the
willingness of courts to apply greater scrutiny to FACTA cases is a
welcome development, at least where only the expiration date
requirement has been violated.23
It is worth noting from the outset that this Comment does not
deal with the entire universe of FACTA credit card receipt
requirement (§ 1681c(g))24 cases. It is primarily concerned with those
cases in which the plaintiff alleges that the merchant printed only the
credit card’s expiration date—not cases in which the credit card
number alone or both the number and the expiration date were
printed. This is largely because courts rarely dismiss a complaint on a
motion to dismiss in which the plaintiff has alleged failure to properly

20. See infra Sections I.B–C.
21. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
23. At least it ought to be a welcome development to both retailers and consumers to
whom the costs of compliance and litigation are passed. The only group that stands to lose
from tightening pleading standards in these cases is the plaintiffs’ bar. Plaintiffs themselves
see little direct benefit from FACTA litigation. The settlement scuttled by Judge Richard
Posner in the RadioShack case is a good example of a typical FACTA settlement. There,
class counsel would have received about $1 million from the settlement while the named
plaintiff would have received $5,000, and class members would have received $10
RadioShack coupons. See Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 628–29 (7th Cir.
2014); see also Keith v. Back Yard Burgers of Neb., Inc., No. 8:11-CV-00135, 2014 WL
4781914, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 23, 2014) (settling for approximately $1.1 million for class
counsel and coupons for plaintiffs); Lori Pilger, Back Yard Burgers Agrees to Settle
Lawsuit, LINCOLN J. STAR (Sept. 19, 2014, 3:15 PM), http://journalstar.com/business/local
/back-yard-burgers-agrees-to-settle-lawsuit/article_c2c4f596-8aca-5d35-be76-daf5f5e4c1b9
.html [https://perma.cc/7ZWZ-QN6J] (“The restaurant also agreed to give out coupons for
a free soft drink with the purchase of an entrée to anyone who submits a valid claim.”).
24. Section 1681c(g) of Title 15 of the U.S. Code provides the FACTA provision
requiring truncation of credit card numbers and removal of expiration dates from credit
card receipts. “Section 1681c(g) cases” will be used as shorthand for FACTA credit card
receipt requirement litigation.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2016)

1318

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

truncate the credit card number.25 Courts treat these facts differently
because of the more obvious risk of credit card fraud presented by
credit card numbers on receipts and the greater publicity surrounding
FACTA’s truncation requirement.26 Further, different inferences
might arise where a defendant truncated the credit card number and
yet printed the expiration date—e.g., that the defendant was aware of
at least some of FACTA’s requirements, attempted to comply, and
thus violated the law negligently rather than recklessly or willfully.
Additionally, this Comment concerns itself exclusively with
attempts to dismiss § 1681c(g) cases on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. It
does so for two reasons. First, the trend in case law that this Comment
discusses only emerged following the Supreme Court’s creation of the
“Twiqbal”27 pleading standards, whose effect is limited to the 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Second, the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss provides
the best opportunity to limit the costs of § 1681c(g) litigation. While
defendants are often successful in obtaining either summary judgment
or denial of class certification in § 1681c(g) claims, both of those
procedures occur later in litigation and presume a defendant willing
to bear the costs of discovery. The costs of discovery result in a higher
settlement value for any lawsuit that has overcome the hurdle of a
motion to dismiss,28 so a successful motion to dismiss better limits
25. The only exception is Katz v. Donna Karan International, Inc., No. 14 Civ.
740(PAC), 2015 WL 405506 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015).
26. See 154 CONG. REC. 8881 (2008) (statement of Rep. Mahoney) (“[T]he publicity
surrounding the passage of [FACTA], whether it was press accounts of the President’s
statement at the signing [or] the subsequent Federal Trade Commission press release
describing the new requirements of the bill, pointed entirely to the truncation of the credit
card number.”).
27. “Twiqbal” is a portmanteau of “Twombly,” from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)—the Court’s first heightened pleading standards case—and “Iqbal”
from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The term “Twiqbal” appears to have first been
used in a published court opinion by Judge Kim R. Gibson of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. See RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois,
754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“That was the standard. No longer. There is a
‘new sheriff in town’ now policing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and his name is ‘Twiqbal.’ ”). But
the term appears to have been coined somewhat earlier. As far as this author can
determine, “Twiqbal” first appears in a law review in the published transcript from a
symposium held by the Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, published almost one year
earlier than RHJ Medical Center. See Transcript, Emerging Civil Justice Issues, 5th Annual
Judicial Symposium on Civil Justice Issues: George Mason Judicial Education Program:
December 5-7, 2010, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 195, 200 (2010).
28. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713,
1731 (2012) (“Asymmetrical cost imposition is usually most pronounced during the
discovery process. In general, access to discovery is granted without limitation once a
motion to dismiss is denied, enabling claimants to impose significant, asymmetric
production costs on the opposing party. . . . Accordingly, a claimant will obtain a ‘motion
to dismiss premium’ in proportion to any temporal or absolute asymmetrical cost
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litigation costs than a motion for summary judgment or for the denial
of class certification.
In that context, this Comment makes two fundamental claims.
First, as an empirical matter, courts more frequently grant motions to
dismiss in post-Iqbal § 1681c(g) cases. Second, § 1681c(g) litigation
based only on an expiration date offers no consumer benefit and
should be limited by the courts. Absent a legislative intervention, the
trend of applying greater scrutiny to complaints on 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss presents the clearest means to mitigate the costs of
§ 1681c(g) litigation and is faithful to the reasoning behind Iqbal and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.29 Such scrutiny is supported by
interpreting Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr30—the Supreme
Court’s decision on “willfulness” in the context of FACTA—as
creating an affirmative defense to liability rather than supplanting the
analysis of a defendant’s subjective state of mind—which is usually
required to establish the element of willfulness.
Under Safeco, the willfulness requirement is not met if the
defendant can show reliance on a reasonable construction of an
ambiguous statute.31 If Safeco creates an affirmative defense, even if a
defendant cannot establish the elements of that defense (such as
where the statutory text is too clear to be considered ambiguous), the
plaintiff still carries a burden. The plaintiff must still make out a

imposition in the discovery stage.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse,
69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636–38 (1989) (“Litigants with weak cases have little use for bringing
the facts to light and every reason to heap costs on the adverse party—on this supposition,
the one in the right. The prospect of these higher costs leads the other side to settle on
favorable terms. All of the models of settlement imply that parties divide between them
the gains from avoiding litigation. More discovery (better: the credible threat of more
discovery) increases these ‘savings,’ which the parties share in a ratio determined by their
endurance, capacity to bluff, and so on—in other words, by factors unrelated to their legal
entitlements. The party in a position to threaten exhaustive discovery can claim for itself
in settlement a portion of the costs that should not have been imposed in the first place.”);
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 101–02
(1971) (“If the payment of X by the defendant yields him a higher utility than his expected
utility from a trial, a settlement will take place. This follows because one can find a
payment somewhat greater than X that gives both parties a higher utility from a
settlement than their expected utilities from a trial. It can further be shown that a
settlement is likely when the following factors are present: (1) both parties have similar
expectations on the probability that the defendant will be found liable in a trial; (2) both
parties have similar estimates of the settlement, given that the defendant is found liable in
a trial; (3) neither party has strong preferences for risk; (4) the costs of a trial including
lawyer’s fees, time costs of the plaintiff and defendant, court fees, etc. exceed the costs of a
settlement.”).
29. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
30. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
31. See id. at 69.
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prima facie case by plausibly pleading that the defendant willfully,
rather than negligently, violated FACTA. Without such a showing of
willfulness, statutory damages are out of the question. If, on the other
hand, Safeco elucidates the meaning of “willfulness” for FACTA
litigation, then the willfulness element necessary for statutory
damages has been met if the statutory language is clear. This
Comment argues that the former interpretation is most faithful to the
reasoning of Safeco and the Supreme Court’s broader jurisprudence
on willfulness in the civil context.32
In order to place these claims in their proper context, Part I
addresses FACTA’s requirements, the Safeco decision’s standard of
willfulness, the costs and dubious benefits of class action FACTA
litigation, and the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on pleading
standards. Part II provides an overview of pre-Iqbal FACTA case
law. Part III analyzes post-Iqbal case law and establishes the
increasing frequency with which courts grant motions to dismiss. Part
IV shows that competing interpretations of Safeco underlie much of
the FACTA case law. It goes on to argue that Safeco should be
understood as supplementing rather than supplanting the traditional
subjective analysis of a defendant’s state of mind in showing
willfulness. The Comment concludes by briefly considering potential
legislative remedies to the costly litigation caused by FACTA’s
expiration date removal requirement.
I. BACKGROUND
Before addressing the specific claims of this Comment, it is
necessary to examine the statutory background of FACTA litigation,
the realities of class action § 1681c(g) litigation, the case law
establishing what constitutes “willfulness,” and the standards for a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Sections I.A and I.B will examine
FACTA and its underlying policies, as well as the reasons for the
temporary safe harbor Congress later created for violations of the
expiration date requirement. Next, Section I.C will explore the
realities of § 1681c(g) litigation, particularly the massive liability that
defendants face from the aggregation of statutory damages via class
action suits. Third, because the recovery of statutory damages
depends on showing that a defendant willfully violated FACTA,
Section I.D will explore Safeco, the Supreme Court decision
establishing the meaning of willfulness in FACTA cases. Finally,
Section I.E will examine the “new” pleading standards established in
32. See infra Part IV.
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Twombly and Iqbal in order to better inform the later discussion of
pre- and post-Iqbal § 1681c(g) case law.
A. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
Congress passed FACTA on December 4, 2003, amending the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”).33 FACTA was intended to
address identity theft by, among other provisions, requiring lenders to
identify and respond to possible indications of identity theft, giving
consumers greater control over their credit history and information,
and establishing the rights of identity theft victims.34 For example,
FACTA’s “red flag guidelines” require that financial institutions not
issue a replacement credit card shortly after a change of address on an
account—a common ploy used by credit card fraudsters—without
first sending a notification to the former address, contacting the
cardholder, or otherwise verifying the change of address.35 FACTA
also requires merchants to truncate credit card numbers and to
remove expiration dates from certain receipts given to consumers:
[N]o person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the
transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of
the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt
provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or
transaction. . . . This subsection shall apply only to receipts that
are electronically printed, and shall not apply to transactions in
which the sole means of recording a credit card or debit card
account number is by handwriting or by an imprint or copy of
the card.36
Before FACTA went into effect, consumer receipts had proven to be
a gold mine for enterprising criminals who could easily retrieve
discarded receipts.37 By eliminating this source of credit card
information, Congress hoped to reduce credit card fraud.38

33. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)).
34. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012).
35. Id. § 1681m(e)(1)(C).
36. Id. § 1681c(g)(1)–(2).
37. See Protecting Against Credit Card Fraud, FTC: CONSUMER INFO. (July 2012),
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0216-protecting-against-credit-card-fraud
[https://perma.cc/5MX5-69WE].
38. See 149 CONG. REC. H12198-01 (2003) (comments of Rep. Maloney). But see
Edward A. Morse & Vasant Raval, Private Ordering in Light of the Law: Achieving
Consumer Protection Through Payment Card Security Measures, 10 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L.J. 213, 224–25, 254 (2012) (noting that merchants, rather than consumers, directly
bear the costs of fraudulent transactions).
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However, Congress did not intend FACTA to cover all credit
card receipts.39 The statute both limits its coverage to “electronically
printed” receipts and expressly exempts handwritten receipts and
receipts produced by carbon imprint.40 This exemption appears to be
based on a judgment that the decreasing frequency of the use of such
techniques did not justify imposing the costs of new point-of-sale
systems on merchants who depended on these older methods.41
Further, the “electronically printed” language has been widely
interpreted to exclude receipts for online transactions as not being
printed “at the point of the sale.”42 Congress also provided a threeyear phase-in period from the date of enactment before FACTA’s
requirements would go into full effect for point-of-sale devices in use
before 2005.43 This phase-in period provided merchants with an
opportunity to bring older point-of-sale systems into compliance with
FACTA’s requirements.44 At the time the law went into effect, many
merchants were not yet in full compliance, particularly as to the
requirement to remove credit card expiration dates from receipts.45
FACTA provides for the recovery of damages based on either
negligent or willful violations of the law’s requirements.46 For
negligent violations, a plaintiff may recover only actual damages,47
whereas, unless actual damages are greater, willful violations can
result in statutory damages from $100 to $1,000,48 in addition to any
punitive damages awarded.49 In either case, a successful plaintiff may

39. See § 1681c(g)(2) (“This subsection shall apply only to receipts that are
electronically printed, and shall not apply to transactions in which the sole means of
recording a credit card or debit card account number is by handwriting or by an imprint or
copy of the card.”).
40. Id.
41. See Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 254 (“[T]his restrictive approach toward
reducing security risks may be justified when the expected consumer harm (and merchant
losses) from reduced access to payment options may outweigh the limited marginal risk
from the low-volume and high-cost form of identity theft based on carbon forms.”).
42. See, e.g., Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 798, 802 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing district courts reaching the same conclusion), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1007
(2011).
43. § 1681c(g)(3) (requiring that devices brought online beginning January 1, 2005, be
FACTA compliant).
44. See id.
45. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat. 1565 (2008); see also infra note 54.
46. §§ 1681n, 1681o. According to Safeco, a willful violation is either a reckless or
knowing violation of FACTA’s requirements. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
47. Id. § 1681o(a)(1).
48. Id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A).
49. Id. § 1681n(a)(2).
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obtain costs and attorney’s fees from the defendant.50 Additionally,
FACTA imposes no cap on total damages, whether as to an
individual plaintiff or in the aggregate.51 Accordingly, § 1681c(g)
violators are an attractive target for enterprising class action counsel
because of the possibility of obtaining attorney’s fees and the
repeating nature of FACTA violations, viz., that a noncompliant
point-of-sale system will continually print noncompliant receipts, each
potentially enlarging the class of plaintiffs.52 Many businesses
discovered this after § 1681c(g)’s requirements became effective and
§ 1681c(g) lawsuits flooded federal courts.
B.

The Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007

In response to the rash of lawsuits that followed the truncation
requirement’s effective date, Congress passed the Credit and Debit
Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007 (the “Clarification Act”).53
While retailers and point-of-sale providers had largely understood
that FACTA requires credit card numbers to be truncated on
electronic receipts generated at the point of sale, many failed to
understand that FACTA also requires the removal of expiration
dates.54 This misunderstanding appears to have stemmed from the fact
that even the government’s own publicity regarding the new
requirements focused entirely on the credit card number truncation
requirement.55 As a result of retail merchants’ failure to understand
FACTA’s requirements, many noncompliant receipts were printed,
and plaintiffs brought hundreds of lawsuits alleging willful violations
of FACTA by the printing of credit card receipts with expiration
dates.56 Congress recognized the lack of consumer benefit from such
50. Id. §§ 1681n(a)(3), 1681o(a)(2).
51. See id. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
52. What is printed on a receipt is determined by how a point of sale device is
configured. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey J. Hawkins, Exec. Dir., Glob. Software Dev.,
Toshiba Global Commerce Solutions, Inc. (Feb. 3, 2015). A device programmed to print
all the digits of a credit number or to print a card’s expiration date will continually print
until it is reconfigured to do otherwise. The size of the class will be especially large if a
faulty configuration is used across an entire retail chain as opposed to just at one
location—every device in every location will generate noncompliant receipts for all
consumer transactions that take place so long as the devices are improperly configured.
53. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat. 1565 (2008).
54. See 154 CONG. REC. 8881 (2008) (statement of Rep. Mahoney) (“The
overwhelming majority of businesses believed that they were in compliance with this
provision of the law by truncating the card number and printing the expiration date of the
credit card.”).
55. See id.
56. Clarification Act § 2(a)(4).
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lawsuits and passed the Clarification Act to create a temporary safe
harbor against lawsuits alleging willful violations of the expiration
date requirement for the period from FACTA’s enactment in
December 2004 to the enactment of the Clarification Act on June 3,
2008.57
In addition to the safe harbor provision it enacted, Congress
made a number of findings of fact:








That merchants had widely understood the statute to require
truncation of the credit card number or removal of the
expiration date, rather than requiring both;
That hundreds of lawsuits were filed on the basis of an
expiration date alone, none of which contained allegations of
harm to any consumer’s identity;
That experts agreed that truncation of the card number
rendered removal of the expiration date superfluous, such that
removal of the expiration date does not provide any benefit to
consumers in preventing identity theft or credit card fraud;
and
That the widespread litigation represented a “significant
burden” on merchants, the costs of which would likely be
passed on to consumers, creating a true harm to consumers.58

These findings establish that the expiration date requirement fails to
provide additional consumer protection while simultaneously creating
significant litigation costs for merchants.59
Further, in the Clarification Act’s purpose clause, Congress
labeled lawsuits based only on a printed expiration date without an
accompanying allegation of actual harm as “abusive,” given the lack
of additional consumer protection generated by requiring removal of
expiration dates and the likely harm to consumers via higher prices
resulting from the additional removal requirement and resulting
litigation.60 As evinced by the limited temporal nature of the safeharbor provision, however, Congress did not amend the statute to
require actual damages for a suit based only on the presence of the
expiration date or otherwise put an end to such lawsuits.61 Merchants
are thus left in the strange position of having to ensure compliance
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d) (2012).
Clarification Act § 2(a).
See id.
Id. § 2(b).
See id. § 3(a).
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with a requirement that offers little to no consumer benefit or else
face potentially massive liability for noncompliance via class action
litigation.
C.

Class Action FACTA Litigation

All, or nearly all, § 1681c(g) suits allege willful violations and
seek to obtain statutory rather than actual damages.62 Statutory
damages, combined with the repeating nature of FACTA violations—
point-of-sale systems are programmed to always print certain
information on receipts and if incorrectly programmed will print
noncompliant receipts for all transactions—create an attractive fact
pattern for class action plaintiffs’ attorneys.63 Sometimes the same
plaintiffs and attorneys may file multiple lawsuits against different
defendants, and the plaintiff may be an employee or relative of an
employee of the law firm.64 This behavior suggests that FACTA
powerfully incentivizes plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek out § 1681c(g)
violations, essentially acting as “bounty hunters.”65 Such conduct is
unsurprising given the potentially massive liability and the
correspondingly higher settlement value of even weak § 1681c(g)
cases. For example, in one case, the potential class included 2.9
million consumers, bringing potential statutory damages to between
$290 million and $2.9 billion—a powerful incentive for

62. See id. § 2(a)(4). In the course of his own research, this author has never found a
case alleging actual damages, except where plaintiffs’ claims for willful violation were
foreclosed by the Clarification Act. See, e.g., Aliano v. Amerigas Partners, L.P., No. 07 C
4110, 2009 WL 635547, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009) (citing similar cases). To speculate,
the lack of cases alleging actual damage may result from the fact that merchants, rather
than consumers, bear the costs of fraudulent transactions and, additionally, that the
information on a credit card receipt is probably insufficient for the purposes of identity
thieves. See Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 224–25.
63. See Clarification Act § 2(a)(4) (noting that “hundreds of lawsuits were filed”
alleging willful violation of FACTA “almost immediately after the deadline for
compliance passed”).
64. See, e.g., Ehrheart v. Lifetime Brands, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 753, 753 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (Jennifer Ehrheart, represented by Gary F. Lynch et al.); Ehrheart v. Verizon
Wireless, 547 F. Supp. 2d 463, 463 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (Nicole Ehrheart, represented by Gary
F. Lynch et al.); Ehrheart v. Bose Corp., No. 07-350, 2008 WL 64491, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
10, 2007) (Nicole Ehrheart represented by Gary F. Lynch et al.). According to LinkedIn, a
Jennifer Ehrheart is a staff accountant at Carlson Lynch Ltd., a law firm of which Gary F.
Lynch is a founding partner. Jennifer Ehrheart, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/pub
/jennifer-ehrheart/42/589/93b (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6FK3-MXZT
(dark archive)]; Gary F. Lynch, CARLSON LYNCH, http://carlsonlynch.com/profiles
/GaryLynch (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7UNT-A5B8].
65. Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 256.
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entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys to file suit and for risk-averse
corporations to settle.66
These lawsuits resemble a kind of strike suit—i.e., “suits brought
to force settlement, regardless of merit, merely because the risk of
loss is too great.”67 Usually, “strike suit” denotes a shareholder
derivative action.68 But, whereas a shareholder derivative suit is not
necessarily abusive,69 Congress itself has recognized that there is no
consumer benefit from suits based on the inclusion of expiration dates
on credit card receipts.70 Indeed, even suits based on the credit card
number truncation requirement may offer dubious benefits.71 For
example, consider the case of a movie theatre company that printed
290,000 receipts containing the first four and last four digits of the
credit cards used.72 Despite failing to comply with the law’s
requirement to include no more than the last five digits, in this case
there would still be 100 million possible combinations for the
remaining eight digits, leaving aside the additional combinations
when accounting for the possible expiration dates.73 Further, no actual
damages were ever shown, yet the movie theatre company faced
potential statutory damages of $29 million to $290 million.74
While such potential awards speak to FACTA’s deterrent effect,
such a powerful incentive probably results in disproportionate
investment in compliance with respect to the near-zero risk of harm
to consumers from expiration dates.75 These costs, along with the
66. Lopez v. KB Toys Retail, Inc., No. CV 07-144-JFW (CWx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82025, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2007).
67. Michael E. Chaplin, What’s So Fair About the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 307, 324–25 (2008).
68. Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
69. See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 119 (1999) (“The primary method for enforcing management’s
fiduciary duties is the shareholder derivative action.”).
70. See Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-241 § 2(a)(6), 122 Stat. 1565 (2008).
71. See Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 254–56.
72. Id. at 255 (citing Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.
2010)). It is unclear from FACTA’s legislative history why Congress drew the line at no
more than five digits. It may be that five was judged to be the maximum number of digits a
consumer would need to differentiate one card from another without giving away too
much of the account number. Of course, much of legislative line drawing results in
problems of over- or under-inclusiveness.
73. Id.
74. To elaborate: 290,000 printed receipts multiplied by the range of possible
statutory damages per violation of $100 to $1000 equals $29 million to $290 million. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2012); Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 255 (citing Bateman v. Am.
Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010)).
75. Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 256.
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costs of litigation and settlements spurred on by the “bounty” of
windfall statutory damages, are ultimately borne by consumers.76 In
light of these incentives to settle, defendants are unlikely to pursue
litigation into discovery. Yet even pre-Iqbal defendants were not
entirely without defenses against allegations of a willful violation of
§ 1681c(g).
D. Safeco—“Willfulness” in FACTA Litigation
Section 1681c(g) defendants have attempted to raise a variety of
defenses, including attacking plaintiffs’ Article III standing for lack of
injury in fact, as well as challenging FACTA’s damages provisions as
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for being
unconstitutionally vague or for the statutory damages being unduly
punitive in proportion to actual damages.77 With one exception,
federal courts have rejected such constitutional challenges to the
law.78 Additionally, defendants often successfully challenge class
certification, though a discussion of these efforts is beyond the scope
of this Comment, particularly because class certification is usually
addressed after a 12(b)(6) motion has been rejected.79
Given the failure of these constitutional challenges, a defendant’s
best recourse on a motion to dismiss is to argue that the plaintiff has
not adequately pleaded the willfulness element necessary for the
recovery of statutory damages. Accordingly, the success of a 12(b)(6)
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham, L.L.C., 552 F. Supp. 2d
1302, 1305–09 (N.D. Ala. 2008) (dismissing four cases on summary judgment and holding
FACTA unconstitutionally vague), vacated, Harris v. Mex. Specialty Foods, 564 F.3d 1301
(11th Cir. 2009); Amason v. Kangaroo Express, No. 7:09-CV-2117-RDP, 2013 WL 985536,
at *3–4 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 2013) (rejecting a challenge to plaintiff’s Article III standing
and noting that other district courts have examined the question and reached the same
result).
78. The exception is Grimes. 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–09. For a case rejecting various
constitutional arguments where the United States intervened to defend the statute, see
Irvine v. 233 Skydeck, LLC, 597 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802–04 (N.D. Ill. 2009). The Irvine court
rejected the vagueness challenge, observing that providing a range of available statutory
damages is commonplace and routinely upheld as understandable to an ordinary person
operating a business. Id. at 803. In response to the excessively punitive damages argument,
the court noted that courts routinely reduce excessive awards and, in any case, it was
premature to make such an as-applied challenge on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 804.
79. See, e.g., Ticknor v. Rouse’s Enters., L.L.C., No. 14-30550, 592 Fed. App’x. 276,
2014 WL 6440397, at *1 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of class certification on
predominance and superiority grounds); see also Holly S. Hosford, Avoiding Annihilation:
Why Trial Judges Should Refuse to Certify a FACTA Class Action for Statutory Damages
Where the Recovery Would Likely Leave the Defendant Facing Imminent Insolvency, 81
MISS. L.J. 1941, 1942–44 (2012) (arguing for denial of class certification given the potential
for annihilative aggregate statutory damages).
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motion to dismiss will depend on how “willfulness” is defined. The
Supreme Court established in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v.
Burr that, in the context of FACTA litigation, “willfulness” includes
both knowing violations of the law’s provisions as well as violations
caused by reckless disregard of § 1681c(g).80
In Safeco—a consolidation of two similar cases from the Ninth
Circuit—the defendant insurance companies were sued for violations
of FACTA provisions unrelated to the credit card requirements,
specifically for failure to give notice to a consumer that an adverse
action (offering higher than the best available insurance premiums)
was taken based on the consumers’ credit reports.81 Following grants
of summary judgment for the defendants in the district courts, the
Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded both cases, holding that actions
taken in reckless disregard of consumers’ rights under FACTA
constitute willful violations.82 The Supreme Court took up the case to
resolve a circuit split as to whether “willfulness” reached not only
knowing and intentional violations of FACTA but also those
occurring due to reckless disregard.83
After agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that “willfulness” under
FACTA includes reckless disregard, the Court went on to define
“reckless disregard.”84 Making clear that it was not “deviat[ing] from
the common law understanding” of recklessness, the Court
unanimously held that
a company subject to the FCRA does not act in reckless
disregard . . . unless the action is not only a violation under a
reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that the
company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater
than the risk associated with a reading that was merely
careless.85
In other words, conduct based on an interpretation of the statute that
is not “objectively unreasonable” does not rise to the level of reckless
disregard, even if the interpretation is mistaken.86

80. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56–60 (2007).
81. Id. at 54–56.
82. Id. at 55–56.
83. Id. at 56 & n.8.
84. Id. at 68–70.
85. Id. at 69.
86. Id. at 70 (“Given this dearth of guidance and the less-than-pellucid statutory text,
Safeco’s reading was not objectively unreasonable, and so falls well short of raising the
‘unjustifiably high risk’ of violating the statute necessary for reckless liability.”).
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Given the relative clarity of § 1681c(g), Safeco has been of
limited utility to defendants in that context. Some courts have even
interpreted it to foreclose dismissal of complaints alleging inclusion of
an expiration date on credit card receipts because the truncation
requirements are clear.87 Safeco does occasionally aid defendants
where there is a novel or unusual fact pattern, such as where the
defendant printed the month but not the year of a card’s expiration
date.88 In such cases, courts examine (1) whether the defendant’s
interpretation has some basis in the text of the statute; (2) whether
federal courts of appeal or administrative agencies have
authoritatively interpreted the language in question; and (3) in a court
of appeal, whether the district court found the defendant’s
interpretation persuasive.89
Because defendants have largely been unable to use a Safeco
defense on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, they have turned to
attacking the complaint as failing to adequately plead a willful
violation of FACTA.90 This has become the most common and most
successful line of argument for disposing of § 1681c(g) suits before
entering into discovery.91 But this success is a relatively new
development in the case law—one that only fully took shape
following the Supreme Court’s new pleading standards jurisprudence
in the late 2000s.92
E.

Twombly and Iqbal—“New” Pleading Standards

A full discussion of the latest FACTA case law is incomplete
without the context of the development of federal pleading standards,
particularly since the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal decisions. Recent § 1681c(g) cases granting motions to dismiss
rely in part on more carefully scrutinizing complaints in light of
87. E.g., Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 755, 761–62 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
88. See Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., 671 F.3d 371, 377 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that
printing the month did violate FACTA but that the violation was not willful because it was
based on a mistaken but not objectively unreasonable interpretation of the statute); see
also Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 638–40 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.)
(printing the month alone may have violated FACTA but was not willful because it was
based on “a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute”).
89. See Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70; Redman, 768 F.3d at 639–40. See generally S.L. Owens,
Avoiding the Urkel Defense (Did I Do That?): How Safeco Has (and Has Not) Begun to
Provide an Affirmative Defense Against Statutory Willfulness, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 51 (2015)
(describing the use of the Safeco defense in the context of various federal statutes,
including FACTA).
90. See infra Parts II–III.
91. Infra Part III.
92. Id.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2016)

1330

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

Twombly and Iqbal.93 Cases denying motions to dismiss, on the other
hand, typically fail to engage in a rigorous “Twiqbal” analysis.94 The
opposing views playing out in the FACTA case law could be
considered a mere flash point in a larger debate about the state of
pleading standards after Twombly and Iqbal and whether those two
cases are to be construed in continuity with or as a break from preTwiqbal pleading standards.95
Before the Twiqbal decisions, the pleading standard established
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was known as “notice
pleading.”96 Unlike the earlier code pleading that required detailed
factual allegations,97 notice pleading was meant to provide no more
than notice to the parties and the court—that is, a general idea of the
claim being made and the basis for the relief requested.98
Accordingly, Rule 8 requires only “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”99 This loose
standard received its classical interpretation in Conley v. Gibson.100
“In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow . . . the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim.”101 But Twombly and
Iqbal dispensed with this language and cast into doubt the validity of
notice pleading.

93. See, e.g., Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette I), No. 13
Civ. 7013(JSR), 2014 WL 2990110, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014) (holding that
plaintiff’s allegations of a willful violation of § 1681c(g) were implausible), appeal
docketed, No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014).
94. See infra note 156.
95. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 127–30 (2010) (arguing that
Twombly and Iqbal do represent a significant shift in pleading standards, one that
threatens public access to federal courts for the redress of wrongs, in sharp contrast to the
notice pleading approach exemplified by the classic civil procedure case of
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944)); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2010) (“The only aspect of prior case law
that Twombly and Iqbal set aside was a misunderstood fifty-year-old phrase whose real
meaning was never called into question.”).
96. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
97. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 459–60 (1943) (noting that
although adopted to reform the overly detailed and complex common law pleading, code
pleading had shown the same tendency to ever-greater factual specificity and detail as its
predecessor).
98. Id. at 460.
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
100. Conley, 355 U.S. at 41.
101. Id. at 45–46.
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In Twombly, consumers sued local telephone companies—
“incumbent local exchange carriers” that had once held regional
monopolies on local phone service but were later required to open
their networks to competing phone services—alleging patterns of
parallel conduct produced by collusion not to compete with each
other in order to restrain the entry of new competition.102 The
Southern District of New York dismissed the case on a 12(b)(6)
motion, holding that mere allegation of parallel business conduct was
insufficient to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.103
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.104 Relying on the classic
language from Conley, the Second Circuit held that the district court
had employed too stringent a standard in evaluating the complaint.105
The Supreme Court reversed.106
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Court held that a complaint
must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”107 The
Court continued, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level,” though such allegations must
still be assumed to be true, however improbable.108 Accordingly, mere
parallel conduct and a “bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice”
because such allegations raise only a possibility of entitlement to
relief—they do not render the claim plausible.109 The Court went on
to disavow the “no set of facts” language from Conley upon which the
Second Circuit depended, characterizing it as an “incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard” that described “the
breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims,
not the minimum standard of adequate pleading.”110
Beyond the consensus in the legal community that Twombly
represented some kind of change, questions remained about the
decision’s breadth.111 Specifically, it was unclear whether a broad shift
in pleading standards had occurred or whether Twombly was
102. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549–51 (2007).
103. Id. at 552.
104. Id. at 553.
105. Id. (holding that to dismiss the complaint, it would be necessary “to conclude that
there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular
parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than coincidence” (quoting
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005))).
106. Id. at 570.
107. Id. at 555.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 556–57.
110. Id. at 562–63.
111. Steinman, supra note 95, at 1305–06.
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somehow limited to the antitrust context.112 But in 2009, the Supreme
Court made clear in Iqbal that Twombly concerned the pleading
standards applicable not just to antitrust cases, but to all cases.113
In Iqbal, plaintiff Javaid Iqbal sued John Ashcroft, the former
U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, the former Director of
the FBI, alleging that, following his arrest in the wake of the
September 11 attacks, Iqbal had been deprived of his constitutional
rights.114 Specifically, Iqbal alleged that “harsh conditions of
confinement” were imposed on the basis of his “race, religion, or
national origin.”115 Before Twombly was decided, the Eastern District
of New York, relying on the “no set of facts” language from Conley,116
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified
immunity, after which an interlocutory appeal was filed.117 The
Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that while Twombly had retired
the Conley formula, the new standard only applied in certain
“contexts where [factual] amplification is needed to render the claim
plausible.”118 But Iqbal’s case did present such a context, and the
Supreme Court reversed.119
Reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court emphasized
that Twombly was not limited to the antitrust context but applied to
all complaints as an interpretation of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.120 Indeed, the Court expressly rejected the argument
that Twombly was limited to antitrust cases.121 Elaborating on
Twombly’s language, the Iqbal Court set forth two principles
governing 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. First, legal conclusions ought
not be assumed true whereas factual allegations must still be
presumed true; second, a complaint must state a “plausible claim for
relief,” something more than “the mere possibility of misconduct.”122
This second step requires judges to “draw on [their] judicial
experience and common sense” in performing this “context-specific
task.”123

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1305.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
Id. at 666.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 670 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)).
See id. at 687.
See id. at 677–78.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 678–79.
Id. at 679.
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The judicial sifting that Twombly and Iqbal require courts to
engage in is meant to respond to the increasing costs of discovery and
the danger of extortionate strike suits.124 In Twombly, a complex
antitrust case, financial costs were directly implicated: “something
beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a
plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up the
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.”125 The Court
continued, “[T]his basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the
court.”126 That point of minimum expenditure is the 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, before discovery begins.127 Although concerns with the
financial costs of discovery were not so directly at issue in Iqbal’s civil
rights claim, an analogous concern was present.128 Civil rights suits
such as Iqbal’s threaten to distract the attention of government
officials and divert resources from the concerns of governing.129
Accordingly, the Twombly and Iqbal standard is concerned with
freeing defendants from the costs of frivolous discovery and thereby
reducing the settlement value of otherwise meritless suits. In applying
that standard, courts should therefore weigh the risks and costs of
discovery against the social utility to be gained.130
Whether Twombly and Iqbal establish a new and heightened
pleading standard or merely refine the method by which courts
evaluate complaints on a 12(b)(6) motion continues to be debated,131
124. See generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1621, 1630 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly and
Iqbal “to recalibrate plaintiffs’ discovery rights” is justified in light of the costs of ediscovery and reflects a preexisting practice among district courts responding to those
costs, while also noting that there may be better means to control discovery costs).
125. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharms.,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)) (internal quotation marks removed).
126. Id. at 558 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1216, at 233–34 (3d ed. 2004)).
127. Fitzpatrick, supra note 124, at 1627 (“Summary judgment was too late to weed out
meritorious claims, the Court said, because discovery had become far too costly and
burdensome to force defendants to endure it without at least some assurance that the
endeavor had some merit to it.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557–59)).
128. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (following Twombly in rejecting the “careful-casemanagement” approach to cabining discovery).
129. See id. at 685 (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with
the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and
resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the
Government.”).
130. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 124, at 1627–28.
131. See Michael Eaton, The Key to the Courthouse Door: The Effect of Ashcroft v.
Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 315–25 (2011)
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but after Iqbal, it is certain that 12(b)(6) motions cannot be disposed
of without reference to and application of the Rule 8 standard as set
forth in those cases. As we will see, this is particularly true in the
context of § 1681c(g) claims, where Iqbal has had a substantial effect
on the granting of motions to dismiss.132
Having surveyed the background law necessary to understand
the FACTA case law, we now turn to a brief examination of the preIqbal § 1681c(g) litigation. Thereafter our attention will turn to the
post-Iqbal case law and the competing interpretations of Safeco in
those cases.
II. PRE-IQBAL FACTA RECEIPT REQUIREMENT LITIGATION
Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, defendants rarely obtained
dismissal of FACTA receipt complaints on 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss.133 Excluding complaints based on internet receipts, claims
foreclosed by the Clarification Act, and those where Safeco applies,134
prior to Iqbal only two district courts had dismissed complaints for
factual insufficiency of the pleadings—more specifically, failure to
plausibly allege a willful violation.135 Unsurprisingly, both courts cited
to and applied Twombly.136 But those were rare exceptions, and their

(contrasting these competing views of the “Twiqbal” standard); see also Jonah B. Gelbach,
Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2277–78 (2012) (finding, in an empirical study,
that the Twiqbal standard has not only had effects on grant rates of 12(b)(6) motions, but
has also had effects in terms of what suits are brought by plaintiffs). There is a rich
empirical literature on the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the federal courts. See
generally, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101
VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015) (surveying the previous literature and offering a new empirical
study showing that the existing literature tends to underestimate the impact of the new
pleading standards); David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study
of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (examining the empirical research that
has arisen post-Iqbal).
132. See infra Part III; see also Appendix B.
133. See infra Appendix A.
134. These are all cases of legal rather than factual insufficiency. It is worth recalling
here that this Comment focuses exclusively on cases challenging the plausibility of
plaintiffs’ allegations of a willful violation.
135. Rosenthal v. Longchamp Coral Gables, LLC (Rosenthal I), 603 F. Supp. 2d 1359,
1361–62 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (granting dismissal with leave to amend); Howard v. Hooters, No.
H-07-3399, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2008) (Hughes, J.)
(denying class certification and granting dismissal without leave to amend).
136. Rosenthal I, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (“The Court will analyze Plaintiff’s allegations
under Safeco[] . . . and Twombly.”); Howard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776, at *3 (citing
Twombly for the proposition that “mere assertions and a formulaic recitation of the
statute are insufficient”).
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persuasive force is limited.137 Nonetheless, they anticipate the line of
argument that would later become more successful following Iqbal—
that the plaintiff has failed to make adequate factual allegations to
plausibly claim a willful violation of FACTA.138
Excluding the outliers mentioned above, most pre-Iqbal
complaints survived 12(b)(6) motions by providing only generalized
allegations about the length of time since FACTA’s passage, the
attendant publicity, the compliance of other businesses, and the
practice of credit card companies of informing merchants of
FACTA’s requirements.139 Of the twenty-one written decisions in
which defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately
allege a willful violation, twenty resulted in denials of defendants’
12(b)(6) motions.140 Even counting only cases decided after Twombly,
fifteen resulted in denials of motions to dismiss as compared to two
grants of 12(b)(6) motions.141 Such cases, when they do apply
Twombly, rarely explain why such generalized facts—facts consistent
with either a negligent or a willful violation—are sufficient to make
the claim of liability not merely possible but plausible.142 The implicit
assumption seems to be that given the publicity attendant to
FACTA’s passage, the information about FACTA provided by credit
card companies, and the length of time since FACTA’s passage, any
137. Not only can the decision in Howard v. Hooters be described as idiosyncratic, but
it also fails to make clear what allegations were made in the complaint such that they were
inadequate. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776, at *1–4; see also In re TJX Cos., Fair &
Accurate Credit Transactions Act Litig., No. 07-md-1853-KHV, 2008 WL 2020375, at *3
(D. Kan. May 9, 2008) (“[T]he court dismissed plaintiff’s FACTA claim for insufficient
allegations of willfulness without actually summarizing the complaint.” (citing Howard,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776)). Rosenthal I depends on an argument that is no longer
available today. Specifically, the argument seems to be that because the violation in
question occurred shortly after the expiration of the Clarification Act’s safe-harbor period,
something more than a bare allegation of a noncompliant receipt (containing the
expiration date only) was needed to plausibly suggest that defendant’s noncompliance was
at least reckless rather than negligent. Rosenthal I, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1361–62.
138. See infra Section III.A; see also Appendix B.
139. See infra Appendix A; see, e.g., Kubas v. Standard Parking Corp. Ill., 594 F. Supp.
2d 1029, 1031–32 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (describing plaintiff’s allegations regarding the
enactment of FACTA and its grace period, the practices of card issuers, and other
businesses’ compliance).
140. See infra Appendix A.
141. Id. Twombly was decided on May 21, 2007. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 544 (2007).
142. See, e.g., In re TJX Cos., 2008 WL 2020375, at *2; Iosello v. Leiblys, Inc., 502 F.
Supp. 2d 782, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (asserting that the plaintiff’s allegations of general facts
applicable to any § 1681c(g) defendant plausibly suggest willfulness but failing to say why
such facts, consistent with either willfulness or negligence, make willfulness plausible);
Ehrheart v. Lifetime Brands, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (stating the
same).
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violation of § 1681c(g) is sufficient to make out a plausible claim for a
willful violation.
An example of this tendency can be found in In re TJX Cos., Fair
& Accurate Credit Transactions Act Litigation,143 where the plaintiff
alleged the inclusion of an expiration date on a receipt.144 The court,
on its way to rejecting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, first
dutifully noted Twombly and the new plausibility standard requiring
“minimal factual allegations” on each element in order to state a
plausible claim.145 Next, rather than engaging in an analysis of the
complaint after disregarding conclusory allegations, the court recited
the plaintiffs’ allegations that “defendants recognized their statutory
duty to limit the information which appeared on customer receipts,
but intentionally ignored that duty and refused to take steps to
comply with FACTA.”146 But those appear to be conclusory
allegations lacking underlying facts, just like the allegations of
conspiracy in Twombly.147 Despite the conclusory nature of these
allegations, the court concluded that “[w]hen taken as true, [they]
state a plausible claim for willful violations of FACTA.”148 Thus, the
court failed to follow Twombly by undertaking the plausibility
analysis after first disregarding conclusory allegations.149
In support of its conclusion, the court produced a string cite of
cases purporting to show both that the plaintiffs’ allegations were
“typical” and that courts have “uniformly rejected the argument that
such allegations do not sufficiently allege willful violations of the
statute.”150 But the four cases cited suffered from the same defect as
In re TJX itself—they failed to analyze how generalized allegations
that are consistent with negligent, reckless, or knowing violations
make a reckless or knowing violation plausible rather than merely
possible.151 This defect is common in the pre-Iqbal case law, and it is

143. No. 07-md-1853-KHV, 2008 WL 2020375 (D. Kan. May 9, 2008).
144. Id. at *1.
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id.
147. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
148. In re TJX, 2008 WL 2020375, at *2.
149. This is somewhat understandable given that Twombly did not articulate the two
required steps as Iqbal would later do. Disregarding conclusory allegations of conspiracy
was instead what the Twombly Court did before holding that allegations of parallel
behavior did not nudge a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act from possible to plausible.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57, 564.
150. In re TJX, 2008 WL 2020375, at *2.
151. See Ramirez v. MGM Mirage, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1233 (D. Nev. 2007);
Follman v. Hosp. Plus of Carpentersville, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962–63 (N.D. Ill. 2007);
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only after Iqbal that courts begin to apply greater scrutiny to
§ 1681c(g) claims.152
III. POST-IQBAL LITIGATION
Despite Iqbal’s clarification of pleading standards, its application
to § 1681c(g) claims has been uneven. Two cases that followed Iqbal
by a matter of months and denied motions to dismiss failed to even
cite Iqbal, much less apply it.153 At least one case concluded, without
any plausibility analysis, that because Safeco did not expressly require
willfulness to be pleaded, a conclusory allegation of willfulness was
sufficient.154 Similarly, another case largely avoided the issue by
asserting that the question of willfulness is more appropriate for
summary judgment.155 More common, however, are cases that cite
Iqbal while depending on pre-Iqbal cases that deny motions to
dismiss § 1681c(g) claims—as though pre-Iqbal case law continues to
have the same persuasive force in a post-Iqbal world.156 Less
frequently, as discussed in the next paragraph, a court rigorously
applies Iqbal yet denies a motion to dismiss.157

Iosello v. Leiblys, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784–85 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Ehrheart v. Lifetime
Brands, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
152. See infra Section III.A; see also Appendix B.
153. Steinberg v. Stitch & Craft, Inc., No. 09-60660-CIV, 2009 WL 2589142, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 18, 2009); Rosenthal v. Longchamp Coral Gables, LLC (Rosenthal II), No. 08–
21757–CIV, 2009 WL 1854846, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2009). It is worth noting that
although this latter motion to dismiss had been briefed prior to Iqbal, defense counsel
filed a notice of supplemental authority on Iqbal two days after that case was decided, and
over a month before the court decided Rosenthal II. See Defendant’s Notice of
Supplemental Authority In Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint at 1–4, Rosenthal v. Longchamp Coral Gables, LLC (S.D. Fla. 2009) (No. 0821757-CIV-MORENO/TORRES), 2009 WL 1854846.
154. Desousa v. Anupam Enters., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-504-FtM-29DNF, 2010 WL
2026114, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2010) (“[Safeco] did not, however, provide that reckless
disregard was an additional allegation that must be pled.”).
155. Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 755, 761 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
156. See, e.g., Lavery v. RadioShack Corp., No. 13-CV-05818, 2014 WL 2819037, at *2
(N.D. Ill. June 23, 2014) (“In this District, such allegations have repeatedly been held
sufficient to survive the pleading stage.” (citing Kubas v. Standard Parking Corp. Ill., 594
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031–32 (N.D. Ill. 2009))); Troy v. Home Run Inn, Inc., No. 07 C 4331,
2008 WL 1766526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2008); Dudzienski v. Gordon Food Serv., Inc.,
No. 07 C 4033, 2008 WL 4372720, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2008); Follman, 532 F. Supp. 2d
at 963; Harris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07 CV 2561, 2007 WL 3046162, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 10, 2007); Iosello, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 785.
157. See, e.g., Zaun v. Tuttle, Inc., No. 10-2191 (DWF/JJK), 2011 WL 1741912, at *1–2
(D. Minn. May 4, 2011) (applying Iqbal and denying defendant’s motion to dismiss); see
also Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc. (Fullwood II), No. 13 Civ. 7174(KPF), 2015
WL 4486311, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2015) (holding that, while partial compliance alone
makes recklessness implausible, when combined with the reasonable inference that the
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In Zaun v. Tuttle, Inc.,158 the plaintiff alleged more than the mere
existence of publicity surrounding FACTA and the Clarification
Act—an allegation applicable to any § 1681c(g) defendant.159 The
plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had hired a third-party
point-of-sale systems provider that had warned the defendant that
upgrades to the point-of-sale system were necessary to comply with
FACTA.160 Instead of making the necessary upgrades, the defendant
allegedly “ignored the[] warnings,” then cancelled its contract with
the point-of-sale provider.161 The court concluded that these
allegations in particular were sufficient to allege a willful violation of
FACTA.162 In this case, the court reasoned, the defendant not only
clearly knew of its duty under FACTA, but also knew what actions it
should take to bring its receipts into compliance with FACTA and
still chose not to take those actions in order to save money.163
Accordingly, Zaun provides an example of the kind of allegations that
a plaintiff must be prepared to make in order to overcome the more
demanding standards established by Twombly and Iqbal. Specifically,
plaintiffs would have to plead facts analogous to the damning
allegation that the Zaun defendant was warned that it was violating
§ 1681c(g), but chose to continue to violate FACTA to save money
rather than comply with the law. And Zaun is not alone in rigorously
applying Iqbal to § 1681c(g) claims.
A. The Emerging Trend of Grants of 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss on
the Basis of Failure to Adequately Plead a Willful Violation
Since Iqbal, district courts have shown an increasing willingness
to dismiss § 1681c(g) claims where only an expiration date has been
included on the receipt.164 Excluding cases dealing with online
receipts, merchant copies, and the inclusion of the credit card number
on the receipt, as well as motions to dismiss third-party complaints
and cases that otherwise do not address the plausibility of the
allegations of willfulness or where Safeco applies, there are a total of
eighteen written decisions granting or denying 12(b)(6) motions to

defendant had specifically negotiated an exception in its liability insurance coverage for
FACTA violations, the plaintiff had adequately alleged willfulness).
158. No. 10-2191 (DWF/JJK), 2011 WL 1741912 (D. Minn. May 4, 2011).
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Compare Appendix B, with Appendix A.
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dismiss.165 Of these eighteen decisions, eight grant the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, and two of the remaining ten grant the motion with
prejudice. Further, as noted above, two of the ten cases denying
motions to dismiss were decided shortly after Iqbal and fail to cite or
apply Iqbal.166 Whether or not these two cases are counted, the postIqbal § 1681c(g) cases demonstrate a stark departure from the preIqbal decisions, of which only two granted a motion to dismiss.167
Additionally, the Southern District of New York recently dismissed a
complaint with prejudice when the merchant failed to properly
truncate the credit card number168—an unprecedented result
suggesting that the trend of granting motions to dismiss continues to
gather strength given that cases where too many credit card numbers
are printed are rarely dismissed.169 Although the overall impact of
Twombly and Iqbal may be debated, it is safe to say that for
§ 1681c(g) cases, Iqbal has been a game changer.170
In June 2014, Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New
York authored perhaps the most comprehensive decision dismissing a
§ 1681c(g) complaint,171 which was later followed by a published
165. My methodology in finding cases via Westlaw was to first use “1681c(g)” to pull
the appropriate FACTA receipt requirement cases, then use either “12(b)(6)” or “motion
to dismiss” to further winnow the results. At that point, I sorted the cases by date and read
each case going back to the date of the Iqbal decision on May 18, 2009. I later returned to
the results from the “1681c(g)” query without using the “12(b)(6)” or “motion to dismiss”
filters to ensure that I had not missed any cases disposing of relevant motions to dismiss.
See infra Appendix B for a table of relevant cases. One case, Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s
Steakhouse, Inc., denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, dismissing
the plaintiff’s first amended complaint but granting the plaintiff leave to file a proposed
second amended complaint, while also permitting the defendant to refile the motion to
dismiss in response to the proposed complaint. (Fullwood I), No. 13 Civ. 7174(KPF), 2014
WL 6076733, at *1, *6–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014). This Comment will treat the Fullwood I
case as though the motion to dismiss had been granted with leave to amend.
166. Supra note 94 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
168. Katz v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 740(PAC), 2015 WL 405506, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015) (“[C]ontrary to Plaintiff’s argument, a pleading which
demonstrates negligence does not ‘raise[ ] a triable issue as to recklessness.’ Plaintiff’s
attempt at alleging recklessness—a higher standard, triggering statutory damages—cannot
be achieved by merely alleging negligence—a lower standard, triggering actual damages.
Such a conflation not only erodes the difference between negligence and recklessness, but
it also renders the pleading standards imposed by Rule 12(b)(6) meaningless; in practice, it
would essentially permit all plaintiffs alleging willful FACTA violations to bypass Rule
12(b)(6) and proceed to discovery/summary judgment.” (citations omitted)).
169. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (discussing how cases involving
violations of the credit card requirement are treated differently by courts).
170. Compare Appendix A, with Appendix B.
171. Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette I), No. 13 Civ.
7013(JSR), 2014 WL 2990110, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 143709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014). Oral argument was heard on October 28, 2015, but at the time
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decision denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.172 In
Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette, America, Inc.,173 the plaintiff
alleged that almost all other businesses complied with § 1681c(g), that
various credit card companies had informed the defendant of
FACTA’s requirements, that there was wide publicity of those
requirements, and that credit card companies required removal of
expiration dates.174 These allegations are essentially no different than
those made by most plaintiffs in § 1681c(g) cases, with the exception
of Zaun’s highly specific allegations.175 In his order dismissing the
case, Judge Rakoff noted that the plaintiff implicitly argued that “a
knowing violation can be inferred solely from the fact that a
defendant knew of the relevant statute and then violated it.”176 But
the plaintiff’s position—shared by the case law rejecting motions to
dismiss—misunderstands Safeco and fails to place that decision in the
broader context of civil willfulness jurisprudence, a task Judge Rakoff
takes up in his decision.
Judge Rakoff observed that, while Safeco deals primarily with
the recklessness prong of willfulness under FACTA, it relies on
earlier Supreme Court cases interpreting willfulness in the civil
context.177 In one of those cases, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston,178 the Court stated that to make out a knowing violation, it
is not enough to show that the defendant knew of a legal obligation;
instead, the essence of a knowing violation is to know that one’s
conduct violates that legal obligation.179 Accordingly, Judge Rakoff
held that to survive a motion to dismiss, the “[c]omplaint must plead
sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that defendant knew
that its conduct was violating the statute, and not simply that the
defendant knew about the existence of the statutory provision at
issue.”180 Paris Baguette I therefore interprets Safeco as establishing

of this Comment’s publication, no opinion had issued from the Second Circuit. CruparWeinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct 28, 2015) (No. 56).
172. Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette II), 41 F. Supp. 3d
411, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014).
173. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110.
174. Id. at *2–3.
175. Zaun v. Tuttle, Inc., No. 10-2191 (DWF/JJK), 2011 WL 1741912, at *2 (D. Minn.
May 4, 2011).
176. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *3.
177. Id. at *3–4.
178. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
179. Id. at 127–29.
180. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *4. In doing so, Judge Rakoff expressly
followed the approach of the District of Maine in Viodni v. Acadia Corp., 11-CV-00448NT, 2012 WL 1565128 (D. Me. Apr. 27, 2012) (granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss
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that knowledge of FACTA does not alone make a knowing or
reckless violation—whereas the alternative interpretation of Safeco
forecloses the possibility of dismissal on a 12(b)(6) motion and
essentially eliminates the requirement of a showing of willfulness
because of the clarity of § 1681c(g).181
Judge Rakoff continued by applying Iqbal, noting which
allegations would be disregarded as conclusory before addressing
whether the remaining allegations were sufficient to plausibly infer a
reckless or knowing violation.182 First, he observed that the allegations
of widespread publicity and other businesses’ compliance were
applicable to all FACTA defendants and therefore established
nothing with respect to Paris Baguette.183 Next, weighing the
remaining allegations, the court concluded that the plaintiffs at most
showed that Paris Baguette knew of FACTA and its requirements
and acted negligently.184 Critically, from the fact that Paris Baguette
had complied with the truncation requirement while failing to remove
expiration dates, the court inferred that it was actually implausible to
think that the defendant was more than negligent in its failure to
remove the expiration date—the effort to remove the credit card
numbers, the court reasoned, showed that there was some attempt to
comply.185 This inference is crucial, as much of the earlier case law
had refused to draw any such inference from the fact of partial
compliance, instead focusing on the clarity of the statute and the
corresponding lack of any defense under Safeco.186
By rigorously applying Iqbal, Judge Rakoff arrived at the
question that earlier cases denying motions to dismiss failed to
address: how can general allegations of knowledge of the statute and
and following Trans World Airlines in holding that mere knowledge of a statute is not
sufficient for a knowing violation).
181. See Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *4. Section 1681c(g) reads: “[N]o
person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print
more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt
provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)
(2012). Whatever ambiguity there may be in the statute’s plain text, the Clarification Act
makes plain that printing the expiration date alone is sufficient to violate the statute. See
Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-241, § 3(a), 122 Stat. 1565 (2008).
182. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *4.
183. Id. (citing Komorowski v. All-Am. Indoor Sports, Inc., No. 13-2177-SAC, 2013
WL 4766800, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Sept. 4, 2013); Miller-Huggins v. SpaClinic, LLC, No. 09 C
2677, 2010 WL 963924, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2010)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. E.g., Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“In short,
the statutory text here is not, as was the case in Safeco, ‘less than pellucid.’ ”).
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its requirements make a willful violation plausible when such
knowledge is consistent with either a negligent or willful violation of
§ 1681c(g)? In this case, he concluded that the plaintiff had offered no
further facts that would explain or even suggest why or how a
defendant who had made some effort to comply with FACTA would
knowingly or recklessly disregard the expiration date requirement as
opposed to having merely been negligent in complying.187 The court
reiterated this in its denial of the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration: “[P]laintiff has pleaded no facts that make it
plausible that defendant was anything other than ‘merely
careless’ . . . the allegations . . . show, at best, that defendant knew of
the statute and acted carelessly in not complying with it.”188
Paris Baguette I and II and the other post-Iqbal cases granting
motions to dismiss depend on an interpretation of Safeco that is
sharply at odds with that espoused by other courts. Because Safeco
sets out the Supreme Court’s understanding of willfulness in the
context of FACTA, the interpretation of that case can be
determinative of whether or not willfulness has been adequately
pleaded. Accordingly, Part IV examines how Safeco ought to be
interpreted.
IV. INTERPRETING SAFECO
For the purposes of § 1681c(g) litigation, Safeco presents two
fundamental questions of interpretation for courts. First, should
Safeco be interpreted as adding to preexisting jurisprudence on the
meaning of willfulness in the civil context, or does it constitute the
exclusive measure of willfulness in the context of FACTA? Second,
does Safeco’s not-objectively-unreasonable-reading standard provide
an affirmative defense, or can that standard be used to foreclose the
grant of a motion to dismiss? If Safeco is interpreted as the exclusive
measure of willfulness in the civil context such that it forecloses the
grant of a motion to dismiss because of § 1681c(g)’s clarity, then every
violation of § 1681c(g) becomes a willful violation. Such an
interpretation effectively reads out of the statute the possibility of
negligent violations of § 1681c(g).
Courts have split on these two questions. Courts granting
motions to dismiss—like the Southern District of New York in Paris
Baguette I and II—tend to interpret Safeco with the aid of earlier
187. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *4.
188. Paris Baguette II, 41 F. Supp. 3d 411, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No.
14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014).
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cases like Trans World Airlines and do not use Safeco to foreclose
grants of motions to dismiss.189 Cases denying motions to dismiss take
the opposite tack.190
As with many of the issues arising in § 1681c(g) litigation, there
are few appellate decisions interpreting Safeco in this context and
none directly on point.191 The appellate case that most nearly
addresses the proper interpretation of Safeco is Fuges v. Southwest
Financial Services, Ltd.192 In Fuges, the defendant, a provider of
property reports containing credit information such as liens, was sued
for failure to prepare its property reports in compliance with the
FCRA, as amended by FACTA.193 The defendant moved to dismiss,
arguing that the FCRA did not apply to it, or, if it did, that there was
no willful violation because its interpretation of the statute was not
objectively unreasonable.194 The district court agreed and granted
summary judgment, reasoning that whether or not the FCRA applied,
under the Safeco standard no reasonable jury could find that the
defendant had willfully violated the statute.195 On appeal, the plaintiff
argued that, prior to the litigation, the defendant had never actually
interpreted the statute at all, and so should not be entitled to the
“Safeco reasonable interpretation defense.”196 The Third Circuit
rejected this argument, affirming the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.197
189. See, e.g., Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *3–4 (interpreting Safeco with the
aid of Trans World Airlines); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,
127–29 (1985) (holding that to establish a knowing violation requires showing that the
defendant knew her conduct violated a known legal obligation).
190. See, e.g., Buechler v. Keyco, Inc., No. WDQ-09-2948, 2010 WL 1664226, at *2
(“Buechler has sufficiently alleged willfulness. Unlike the provision of FCRA at issue in
Safeco, the FACTA provision Keyco allegedly violated is unambiguous.”).
191. For example, Schlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. is a straightforward application
of Safeco to a case dealing with an email receipt. 615 F.3d 794, 798–804 (7th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that
internet receipts are not printed and so fall outside of § 1681c(g)). Similarly, Redman v.
RadioShack Corp., in the portion of the decision devoted to the companion case Nicaj v.
Shoe Carnival, affirming the district court’s grant of dismissal with prejudice, held that
omitting only the year of the expiration date constituted “a permissible interpretation of
an ambiguous statute.” 768 F.3d 622, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2014). And the Third Circuit, in
Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., held that omitting the year, while based on an erroneous
interpretation of FACTA, was not a willful violation because such omission was based on
a not objectively unreasonable interpretation. 671 F.3d 371, 377–78 (3d Cir. 2012)
(affirming a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss).
192. Fuges v. Sw. Fin. Servs., Ltd., 707 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2012).
193. Id. at 245.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 243.
196. Id. at 249 (internal quotation marks removed).
197. Id. at 249–51, 255.
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In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit repeatedly
characterized Safeco as a “test” or “defense” rather than as an
elaboration on what constitutes reckless behavior.198 It did so because
Safeco made clear that, for purposes of the test established, intent and
other subjective states of mind are irrelevant.199 In other words,
Safeco creates a defense that requires an objective analysis under
which the defendant’s subjective state of mind does not matter. A
reasonable interpretation of the statute is not dispositive evidence of
an actual, subjective lack of willfulness (i.e., recklessness or knowingly
engaging in conduct violating the statute). Instead, a defendant who
shows an objectively reasonable interpretation of the statute bypasses
entirely the question of subjective willfulness and defeats the
plaintiff’s claim of a willful violation by an affirmative defense. This is
in keeping with the traditional understanding of an affirmative
defense, which defeats the plaintiff’s claim even if she has made out a
prima facie case by establishing the elements of the claim.200
Accordingly, Safeco does not so much define “willfulness”—and so
affect the struggle to establish that element of a claim for statutory
damages—but rather provides an affirmative defense against a prima
facie claim of a willful violation. This reading of Safeco interprets the
decision within the Court’s broader jurisprudence on willfulness in
the civil context while being highly congenial to § 1681c(g) defendants
because even where no Safeco defense is available, the plaintiff must
still adequately plead willfulness and eventually carry the burden of
persuasion on that element—the very piece of the analysis that so
many courts neglect in applying Safeco.201

198. Id. passim.
199. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 70 n.20 (2007) (“To the extent that
[plaintiffs] argue that evidence of subjective bad faith can support a willfulness finding
even when the company’s reading of the statute is objectively reasonable, their argument
is unsound.”).
200. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1270 (3d ed. 2004) (observing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s
recognition of affirmative defenses is a “lineal descendant of the common law plea by way
of ‘confession and avoidance,’ which permitted a defendant who was willing to admit that
the plaintiff’s declaration demonstrated a prima facie case to then go on and allege
additional new material that would defeat the plaintiff’s otherwise valid cause of action”).
In federal courts today, “[a]n affirmative defense will defeat the plaintiff’s claim if it is
accepted by the district court or the jury.” Id. Whereas in the absence of an affirmative
defense a defendant must prevail by preventing the plaintiff from meeting her burden of
persuasion as to the elements of the claim, by asserting an affirmative defense the
defendant provides himself an avenue to victory by meeting his own burden of persuasion
on the elements of the defense.
201. See supra Parts II–III.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2016)

2016]

FACTA LITIGATION

1345

A recent Southern District of New York case similarly concludes
that the unavailability of a Safeco defense does not determine
whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged a willful violation of
FACTA. In Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc.,202 a § 1681c(g)
case, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss but made
clear that the plaintiff could file a proposed amended complaint to
which the defendant would have the opportunity to offer a new
motion to dismiss.203 The court explained that while the plaintiff’s first
amended complaint—which had been the basis of the briefing for the
motion to dismiss—fell short of adequately pleading willfulness, a
new proposed complaint might not be so deficient and deserved
briefing in its own right.204
To reach this conclusion, the court engaged in an extended
discussion of Safeco and what was necessary to adequately plead
willfulness in a § 1681c(g) case.205 First, the court pithily summarized
the interpretive difficulty presented by Safeco: “[I]t is unclear how to
apply the Safeco Court’s standards for a knowing or reckless violation
of the FCRA when the proper interpretation of the particular
statutory provision is not in doubt.”206 The court then characterized
this question of interpretation as presenting two possible answers—
either Safeco forecloses any inquiry into a defendant’s subjective
willfulness because of the clarity of § 1681c(g), or a plaintiff must
plead and eventually prove a subjectively knowing or reckless
violation even in the absence of a not-objectively-unreasonable
reading of the statute. Continuing, the court observed, “If there is
only one reasonable reading of the statute, does a willful violation
flow automatically once knowledge of the statute’s requirements is
demonstrated? Or must there be awareness that the defendant’s
behavior violates or recklessly runs the risk of violating those
requirements?”207

202. Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc. (Fullwood I), No. 13 Civ. 7174(KPF),
2014 WL 6076733 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014).
203. Fullwood I, 2014 WL 6076733, at *1 (“Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied
without prejudice to refile in light of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to her
complaint . . . .”). Despite the court’s characterization, this result is the functional
equivalent of a grant without prejudice of defendant’s motion to dismiss, insofar as the
plaintiff will file an amended complaint to which the defendant will have the opportunity
to respond with a second 12(b)(6) motion.
204. Id. at *7–8.
205. See id. at *4.
206. Id. at *4.
207. Id.
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The court then established that both district and appellate courts
have interpreted Safeco in light of other federal civil statutes.208 At
least two district courts, including the Southern District of New York
in Paris Baguette I and II, had taken the approach of requiring
subjective recklessness, interpreting Safeco in the context of earlier
cases like Trans World Airlines.209 Further, appellate courts have used
Safeco to interpret the meaning of willfulness in other federal
statutes.210 Finding this approach persuasive, the court in Fullwood
concluded that knowledge alone is not enough to make out a willful
violation; instead, knowledge of FACTA and its requirements must
be coupled with “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly violat[ing]
those requirements.”211
Though lacking an authoritative Supreme Court or appellate
decision on point, this interpretation of Safeco as providing an
additional defense to be used alongside, rather than in place of,
subjective willfulness has much to recommend it. First, abundant
persuasive authority supports this interpretation.212 As the Fuges
court points out,213 the Supreme Court’s own dicta in Safeco implies
that, where there is no objectively reasonable reading of the statute
supporting the defendant’s conduct, subjective intent still matters
because the plaintiff must still carry the burden of persuasion on the
willfulness element to recover statutory damages.214 Safeco then
stands only for the proposition that where there is an objectively
reasonable reading, the defendant’s subjective state of mind is
irrelevant.215 Further, the Safeco Court itself emphasized that it was
208. See id. at *4–5.
209. Id. (citing Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette, Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette I), No.
13 Civ. 7013(JSR), 2014 WL 2990110, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014), appeal docketed,
No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014); Vidoni v. Acadia Corp., No. 11-cv-00448-NT, 2012 WL
1565128, at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 27, 2012)).
210. Id. at *5 (citing Fryer v. A.S.A.P. Fire & Safety Corp., 658 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir.
2011) (using Safeco to interpret willfulness under the Age Employment Discrimination
Act); Armalite, Inc., v. Lambert, 544 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2008) (using Safeco to
interpret willfulness under the Gun Control Act of 1968).
211. Id. at *6.
212. See, e.g., Fuges v. Sw. Fin. Servs., Ltd., 707 F.3d 241, 243 (3d Cir. 2012)
(characterizing Safeco as establishing a defense); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47, 69, 70 n.20 (2007) (finding no need to inquire into defendant’s state of mind given the
not objectively unreasonable reading of the statute).
213. Fuges, 707 F.3d at 248–49.
214. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20 (“Respondent-plaintiffs argue that evidence of
subjective bad faith must be taken into account in determining whether a company acted
knowingly or recklessly for purposes of § 1681n(a). To the extent that they argue that
evidence of subjective bad faith can support a willfulness finding even when the company’s
reading of the statute is objectively reasonable, their argument is unsound.”).
215. Id.
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not “deviat[ing] from the common law understanding.”216 Though no
appellate court has ruled directly on point, Fuges217 and the appellate
decisions cited in Fullwood I218 show that appellate courts have
generally interpreted Safeco in this vein as well. Persuasive district
court opinions granting motions to dismiss in § 1681c(g) cases, such as
Paris Baguette I and II,219 further buttress the soundness of this
interpretation.
Sound interpretive and policy reasons also counsel this approach
to Safeco. Unless otherwise indicated, common law terms should be
construed according to their common law understanding, and
Congress crafts legislation expecting the courts to do just that.220
Further, this interpretation avoids creating a balkanized Supreme
Court jurisprudence on civil willfulness, where different standards
apply depending on the statutory context. The alternative—
interpreting Safeco as the exclusive measure of willfulness in the
context of FACTA—would also read out of the statute claims for
negligent violations of § 1681c(g) because that provision’s clarity
precludes any alternative, objectively reasonable reading.
Additionally, lawsuits based on the expiration date alone offer no
consumer benefit,221 and, still more unfavorably, litigation costs will
be passed on to consumers even in the absence of awards or
settlements.222 By interpreting Safeco in line with other decisions on
willfulness rather than as foreclosing motions to dismiss for failure to
adequately plead willfulness, these costs can be somewhat mitigated
by the greater frequency of grants of motions to dismiss and the lower
value of settlements obtained without the threat of discovery.
CONCLUSION
Given the high costs and scant benefits of § 1681c(g) lawsuits
based only on the printing of expiration dates, this Comment has
216. Id. at 69 (“Here, there is no need to pinpoint the negligence/recklessness line, for
Safeco’s reading of the statute, albeit erroneous, was not objectively unreasonable.”).
217. Fuges, 707 F.3d at 249.
218. Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc. (Fullwood I), No. 13 Civ. 7174(KPF),
2014 WL 6076733, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014).
219. Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette, Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette I), No. 13 Civ.
7013(JSR), 2014 WL 2990110, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 143709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014); Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette
II), 41 F. Supp. 3d 411, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2,
2014).
220. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 48 (citing Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500–01 (2000); Comm’r
v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993)).
221. Supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
222. Supra notes 20–28 and accompanying text.
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argued that courts ought to take two related measures to curtail the
social costs of § 1681c(g) litigation in light of the lack of consumer
protection benefit delivered by the expiration date requirement. First,
district courts should not hesitate to engage in the “common sense”
inquiry required by Twombly and Iqbal—an inquiry motivated by the
costs of discovery and the dangers of in terrorem strike suits.223
Second, given that courts cannot decide a motion to dismiss
challenging the adequacy of allegations of willfulness without
reference to Safeco, courts ought to interpret Safeco in the context of
the Supreme Court’s broader civil willfulness jurisprudence and the
term’s common law meaning. By so doing, courts can rein in abusive
§ 1681c(g) litigation.
While there are good legal and policy reasons for courts to take
these steps, they may not be sufficient. The courts cannot write
§ 1681c(g) out of FACTA and the FRCA. Additionally, plaintiffs’
attorneys are likely to adapt to heightened pleading standards and
will find creative ways to adequately plead willfulness.224 Instead, a
legislative solution is necessary. The two simplest and clearest
solutions would be either to: (1) remove entirely the expiration date
requirement from § 1681c(g); or (2) modify the provision for statutory
damages such that none are available where only an expiration date
has been printed, maintaining the possibility of statutory damages for
willful violations of the truncation requirement. Other possibilities
include prohibiting statutory damages for class action suits or placing
a ceiling on aggregate statutory damages to limit potential liability.225
Given the lack of any appreciable consumer benefit from
§ 1681c(g) litigation based on the printing of an expiration date,
proposals to merely cap aggregate statutory damages do not go far
enough. Such proposals would merely reduce the costs to be passed
on to consumers. But the lack of benefits to be gained by these suits
makes any such cost a net loss to consumer welfare. Of the other
proposals, removing the possibility of statutory damages might be
preferable to removing the expiration date provision altogether. This
would leave open the possibility of recovery were some plaintiff to

223. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007).
224. See, e.g., Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse (Fullwood I), No. 13 Civ.
7174(KPF), 2014 WL 6076733, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014) (discussing how much
knowledge is needed to permit a plausible inference of a willful violation and how
plaintiff’s proposed complaint may meet that standard).
225. See Paul Karlsgodt, Statutory Penalties and Class Actions: Social Justice or
Legalized Extortion?, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 47 (2013).
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suffer actual damages through the printing of his card’s expiration
date.
At the same time, in the absence of decisive judicial or legislative
remedies, point-of-sale systems providers and companies with retail
operations ought to ensure that the receipts they print are, and
remain, FACTA compliant. The testing of new point-of-sale systems
and upgrades to older systems should receive special attention.
Although the major players in the point-of-sale industry understand
what FACTA requires and their products comply with FACTA by
default,226 companies that develop their own point-of-sale systems or
depend on less established point-of-sale providers must be especially
vigilant. Despite FACTA-compliant defaults, modern point-of-sale
systems are highly configurable by persons without technical
training,227 and the possibility remains that personnel unaware of
FACTA’s requirements could inadvertently alter the configuration of
a point-of-sale system to print noncompliant receipts.228 Merchants
should put in place safeguards to prevent such personnel from
altering at least those configuration options that are pertinent for
FACTA compliance. The potential costs of noncompliance are too
great to ignore.

226. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey J. Hawkins, supra note 52.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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APPENDIX A. PRE-IQBAL § 1681C(G) DECISIONS ON 12(B)(6)
MOTIONS TO DISMISS ARGUING FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD
WILLFULNESS AND EXCLUDING ONLINE PURCHASES
Date
3/12/07
4/03/07
4/03/07
4/05/07
5/04/07

5/22/07
6/09/07
7/20/07
8/22/07
8/28/07
10/17/07
12/3/07

†

Case Name
Clark v. Marshalls
of MA, Inc.
Blanco v. El Pollo
Loco, Inc.
Aeschbacher v. Cal.
Pizza Kitchen, Inc.
Pirian v. In-N-Out
Burgers
Arcilla v. Adidas
Promotional Retail
Operations, Inc.
Soualian v. Int’l
Coffee and Tea
LLC
Lopez v.
Gymboree Corp.
Ehrheart v.
Lifetime Brands,
Inc.
Iosello v. Leiblys,
Inc.
Korman v. Walking
Co.
Follman v.
Hospitality Plus of
Carpentersville, Inc.
Ramirez v. MGM
Mirage, Inc.

Disposition
Denied
Denied†
Denied
Denied†

Citation
2007 WL 1100412
(C.D. Cal.)
2007 WL 1113997
(C.D. Cal.)
2007 WL 1500853
(C.D. Cal.)
2007 WL 1040864
(C.D. Cal.)

Denied

488 F. Supp. 2d 965
(C.D. Cal.)

Denied†

2007 WL 4877903
(C.D. Cal.)

Denied

2007 WL 1690886
(N.D. Cal.)

Denied†

498 F. Supp. 2d 753
(E.D. Pa.)

Denied
Denied†

502 F. Supp. 2d 782
(N.D. Ill.)
503 F. Supp. 2d 755
(E.D. Pa.)

Denied

532 F. Supp. 2d 960
(N.D. Ill.)

Denied†

524 F. Supp. 2d 1226
(D. Nev.)

It is unclear from the decision whether the expiration date, the credit card number,
or both were printed. Although their precedential value is dubious, the author includes
these cases to be comprehensive.
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Date
12/11/07
12/18/07
2/25/08
3/04/08
3/19/08

FACTA LITIGATION

Case Name
Ehrheart v.
Verizon Wireless
Follman v. Village
Squire, Inc.
Gamaly v. Tumi,
Inc.
Miller v. Sunoco,
Inc.
Dudzienski v.
Gordon Food
Serv., Inc.

Disposition
Denied
Denied
Denied
Denied
Denied
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Citation
547 F. Supp. 2d 463
(W.D. Pa.)
542 F. Supp. 2d 816
(N.D. Ill.)
2008 WL 512718
(N.D. Cal.)
2008 WL 623806
(E.D. Pa.)
2008 WL 4372720
(N.D. Ill.)
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APPENDIX B. POST-IQBAL § 1681C(G) DECISIONS ON 12(B)(6)
MOTIONS TO DISMISS ARGUING FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD
WILLFULNESS WHERE ONLY THE EXPIRATION DATE WAS PRINTED
ON THE RECEIPT AND EXCLUDING ONLINE PURCHASES229
Date

Case Name

Disposition

4/05/08

Howard v. Hooters

Granted

4/14/08

5/09/08

1/29/09
3/19/09
4/22/10
5/4/11
10/12/11
10/18/11
4/27/12
3/19/13
5/13/13
9/4/13

Troy v. Home Run
Inn, Inc.
In re The TJX Cos.,
Inc., Fair and
Accurate Credit
Transactions Act
Kubas v. Standard
Parking Corp. Ill.
Rosenthal v.
Longchamp Coral
Gables LLC
Buechler v. Keyco,
Inc.
Zaun v. Tuttle, Inc.
Sanders v. W&W
Wholesale, Inc.
Seo v. CC CJV Am.
Holdings, Inc.
Vidoni v. Acadia
Corp.
Dover v. Shoe
Show, Inc.
Rouse v. Hennepin
Cty.
Komorowski v.
All-American
Indoor Sports, Inc.

Denied

Citation
2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30776
(S.D. Tex.)
2008 WL 1766526
(N.D. Ill.)

Denied

2008 WL 2020375
(D. Kan.)

Denied

594 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(N.D. Ill.)

Granted
without
prejudice

603 F. Supp. 2d 1359
(S.D. Fla.)

Denied
Denied
Denied
Granted
Granted
Denied
Denied
Granted
without
prejudice

2010 WL 1664226
(D. Md.)
2011 WL 1741912
(D. Minn.)
2011 WL 4840978
(N.D. Ill.)
2011 WL 4946507
(C.D. Cal.)
2012 WL 1565128
(D. Me.)
2013 WL 1748337
(W.D. Pa.)
2013 WL 1969790
(D. Minn.)
2013 WL 4766800
(D. Kan.)

229. Practitioners should also be aware of the recent case in the Southern District of
New York granting with prejudice a 12(b)(6) motion where the defendant failed to
properly truncate the credit card number. Katz v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., No. 14 Civ.
740(PAC), 2015 WL 405506 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015). This case is unprecedented in its
dismissal, although it remains to be seen whether this case represents an outlier or the
beginning of a new trend among federal district courts.
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Date
6/23/14
6/30/14

11/14/14

12/29/14

7/23/15

10/01/15

FACTA LITIGATION

Case Name
Lavery v.
RadioShack Corp.
Crupar-Weinmann
v. Paris Baguette
Am., Inc.
Fullwood v.
Wolfgang’s
Steakhouse, Inc.
(Fullwood I)
Reed v. Swatch
Grp. (US), Inc.
(Reed I)
Fullwood v.
Wolfgang’s
Steakhouse, Inc.
(Fullwood II)
Reed v. Swatch
Grp. (US), Inc.
(Reed II)
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Disposition

Citation

Denied

2014 WL 2819037
(N.D. Ill.)

Granted with
prejudice

2014 WL 2990110
(S.D.N.Y.)

Denied with
leave to refile

2014 WL 6076733
(S.D.N.Y.)

Granted
without
prejudice

2014 WL 7370031
(D.N.J.)

Denied

2015 WL 4486311
(S.D.N.Y.)

Denied

2015 WL 5822669
(D.N.J.)
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